EQUITABLE CONVERSION.
remarks from so high a source were
well calculated to mislead them as
to the proper grounds and consideration upon which they should found
their verdict, and settle the rights
of the parties. The danger that
such would be the effect, whether it
was so or not, would be ;ufficient to
vitiate the verdict. . . . Jurors
should be left to the free and fair

exercise of their judgments, and
not subjected to threat or coercion
to induce 'them to surrender their
honest judgments."
The reader is referred to "Misconduct of the jury as ground for a
new trial," in the July number of
this RBviw.
'WILLIAM SANDERSON FURST.
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Words, Creatinga Conversion of Real Propertyinto .Prsozalty,
ht a Will.
A will authorizing the trustees thereunder-to sell any of the-property
and directing them to invest the proceeds "so as to he safe.and produce
income," and pay the income to the testator's wife and children for their
lives, remainder over, does not mean that the unproductive real estate of
the testator shall be treated as converted as ofrthe .day of his death, so
that only such portion- of the purchase-money would he principal as with
interest from the testator's death to the day of sale, would equal the
entire amount realized, and that the balance should be distributed-as

income, but the entire amount must be treated as principal.
EQUITABI,E CONVCRSION.

By equitable conversion is meant
a change in the nature of property
from real into personal, or from
personal into real, for certain purposes of devolution, not actually
taking place but presumed to exist
only by construction or intendment of equity: Bispham's Equity,
5th ed., 307.
The whole doctrine of equitable
conversion depends upon the wellestablished and familiar principle
that a court of equity looks upon
20 S. W., 778-
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that as done which a testator by his
will hasdirected to becdone, so faras
the will of the decedent could have
been carried into effect without
violating any rule of law or equitable principle: Lorillard v. Coster,
5 Paige, 173; Emerson v. Cutler,
14 Pick., 120.
Conversion may be effected in
two ways: First, by a trust under
a will; and second, by a contract
between parties both living.
As a general rule, in the first
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case, the trust must be couched in
imperative language, and in the
second the contract must be binding.
The conversion in the first instance takes place from the death
of the testator, as that is the time
when the will takes effect, and in
the second instance, from the delivery of the papers forming the
settlement or contract: Van Vechten v. Van Vechten, 8 Paige, io6;
McClure's App., 72 Pa., 414; Loftis
'v. Glass, 15 Ark., 68o: McWilliam's
App., 9 Cent. Rep., 773; Arnold v.
.Gilbert, 5 Barbours S. Ct., 192.
It is only the first of these two
methods of working a conversion
with which we have to deal at
present-that is conversion arising
under a trust in a will.
By the use of certain words of
direction a testator makes it imperative upon his executors or
trustees to convert his estate into
that species of property in which
he wishes to give it to his beneficiaries. It is this duty, imposed
upon the executors or trustees,
which a court of equity considers
as performed, even before actual
conversion has been made, and in
order that the rights of parties in
interest may not be prejudiced by
delay on the part of the executors
or trustees. In carrying out the
direction of the testator, the conversion directed to be made is considered as effected as of the date of
the testator's death: Craig v. Leslie,
3 Wheat., 563; Holland v. Cruft, 3
Gray, i8o; Kane v. Gott, 24 Wend.,
641; Greenland v. Waddell, i6
N. Y., 234; Allison v. Wilson, 13
S. & R., 330; Collins v. Champ's
Heirs, 15B. Mon. (Ky.), X 18; Green
v'. Johnson, 4 Bush., 167.
As a delay on the part of the
executors will not prevent a conversion from taking place, so a

direction in the will postponing
the time of sale will not have that
effect: Hocker v. Gentry, 3 Metc.
(Ky.), 463; High v. Worley, 33
Ala., 196.
There are several well-recognized
ways in which conversion may be
worked by a testator: First, by an
express, imperative direction to
execut'ors or trustees to sell ltnd
and distribute the proceeds, or to
lay out a fund in land for a devisee;
second, by applying to one kind of
property limitations applicable to
it only in its changed form; and,
third, by a blending of real and
personal property in such a waythat distribution can onlybe effected
by a sale of one kind of property
or the other.
The leading English authority on
the subject of equitable conversion
is Bletcher v. Ashburner, i Bro.
C. C., 491. The testator devised
real estate to trustees in trust
(after his widow's death) to sell the
same and divide the proceeds between his son and daughter. Nothing could be more clear and
imperative than such a direction.
The testator's intention, which is
the touchstone by which the question of conversion or no conversion, and indeed most other questions relating to the interpretation
of wills are decided, is here apparent, to wit: that the land
should be sold and the proceeds
divided.
The question before the court
arose in this way: The son and
daughter, the legatees under their
father's will, both died in the lifetime of their mother, until whose
death conversion in fact could not
take place, and so'at the time of
her death the land was still in fact
land, and as such it was claimed by
the son's heir-at-law. The personal
representatives
of the widow
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claimed it as personalty, and Sir
THOMAS SZWJrLL,

M. R., decided

in their favor, saying: "Nothing
is better established than the principle that money directed to be
employed in the purchase of land
and land directed to be sold and
turned into money are to be considered as that species of property
into which they are directed to be
converted. The cases establish this
rule universally."
In the old case of Doughty v.
Bull, 2 P. Win., 320, Lord Chancellor KING held that a direction to
trustees to sell land and distribute
the proceeds, the time of sale being
left to the discretion of the trustees, would work a conversion.
The Lord Chancellor says: "The
rule being that lands devised to be
sold are thereby made personal
estate, this case is within such rule,
the lands.are here devised to be
sold and only the time of sale left
discretionary."
If the direction to sell be imperative a long delay in the sale
will not prevent a conversion:
Yates v. Compton, 3 P. Win., 3o8,
was a case of a devise of land to
executors to sell and pay an annuity. There was a long delay in
the sale and, the annuitant dying
bef6re it was made, the heir claimed
the land. The Lord Chancellor
decided that the clearly expressed
intention of the will was to give
away all from the heir, to turn the
land in question into personal estate, and this must be taken as if it
was at the time of the death of the
testator, and ought not te be altered
by any subsequent accident.

In 1838 Lord

LANGDALE,

M. R.,

held the following will to have
worked a conversion out and out:
"I do empower my wife to sell all
my real estate whatsoever and the
money arising from such sale,

together with my personal estate,
she, my said wife, shall and may
divide and proportion among my
said children as she shall by will
direct." The widow died without
having sold or apportioned the
estate. The power to sell was construed as in the nature of a trust
for the children, and subject to
such apportionment as the widow
might make, the children were entitled in equal shares to the converted real estate: Grieveson v.
Kirsopp, 2 Keen, 653.
The provisions in the wills coisidered in the cases of in re Ibbitson, L. R. 7 Eq., 226, De Beauvoir
v. De Beauvoir, 3 H. L. Cas., 548,
were held not to be couched in
sufficiently imperative language to
effect a conversion, though in the
latter case the intention of the testator was to make his real and personal property blend and to give
the combined fund the character of
real property: See Atwell v. Atwell,
L. R. 13 Eq., 23.
Ix the case of Curling v. May,
cite 1 3 Atk., 255, A gave ,C5oo to
B in trust, that B should lay out
the same upon a purchase of lands
or put the same out on good securities, for the separate use of his
daughter, H (the plaintifPs then
wife), her heirs, etc., and died 1729.
In 1731 H, the daughter, died without issue, before the money was
invested in a purchase. The husband, as administrator, brought a
bill for the money against the heir
of H, and the money was decreed
to the administrator; for the wife,
not having signified any intention
of a preference, the court would
take it as it was found. If the wife
had signified any intention it
should have been observed, but it
was not reasonable at that time to
give either her heir or the administrator or the trustee liberty to elect.
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.Lord TALBOT said: "It was originally personal estate, and yet remained so, and by reason of the
alternative language of the will
nothing could be gathered from it
as to what was the testator's principal intention."
Where the direction was to purchase land or other securities, and
this was followed by the limitation
to trustees in trust for the wife for
life, and after her decease to such
uses and under such provisions,
conditions and limitations as his
lands before devised were limited,
Lord HARDWICKu decided that
-conversion of the above fund was
not at the election of. the trustees.
It was the evident intention of the
testator that the money should be
laid out in land, and the discretion

decisively fix upon the land the
quality of money. The sale directed
in this case depended upon several
contingencies. It was made dependent upon the acceptance or
non-acceptauce of the land on certain terms by his sons. See also
Nagle's App., 13 Pa., 260, and

Stoner v. Zimmerman,

22

Pa., 894.

till lands are purchased, the trustees
might invest the money in personal
securities: Earlom v. Saunders,

In Foster's App., 74 Pa., 391, a
question as to the conversion of
partnership land arose, and Judge
SnrARSWOOD said, delivering the
opinion of the court: "Conversion
is altogether a doctrine of equity.
In law it has no being. It is admitted only for the accomplish-'
ment of equitable results. It may
be termed an equitable fiction, and
the legal maxim in fictione juris
sexper subsisil equitas has redoubled force in application to it.
It follows, of necessity, that it is
limited to its end. When the purpose of conversion is attained con-

Amb.,

version ends, or, more accurately,

must be taken to mean only that,

241.

Had there been no clause showing conclusively the testator's intention to convert, the alternative
character of this direction would
have prevented a conversion from
being effected.
In Bleight v. the Bank, io Pa.,
131, a conveyance to trustees to
pay an annuity out of the rents
of certain real estate or to sell
was held not to make a conversion because it was not imperative on the trustees to exercise the
power. Where a discretion whether
to sell or not is vested in any executor or devisee conversion does
not take place.
Mr. Justice THoMPsoN says in
Anewalt's App., 42 Pa., 414: "To
establish a conversion the will
must direct it out and out, irrespective of all contingencies. The
direction to convert must be positive and explicit and the will must

reconversion takes place."
Where the conversion directed
to be made is only for certain purposes, those purposes failing the
conversion does not take place, but
it is sometimes a difficult question
whether the intention of the testator is to convert only for the purposes of the will or out and out for
all purposes. This can only be
determined by a consideration of
the entire will.
In Page's Estate, 75 Pa., 87, the
entire estate was vested in trustees,
the personalty to be held upon certain trusts, and the executors, in
the fourth item of the will were
clothed with a discretionary power
to sell any part of the real estate,
the proceeds of such sales to be held
upon the same trust. It was held
that although conversion may arise
without express terms, where it is
clear that the testator meant to
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create a fund out of both real and
personal estate, and bequeathed it
as money, yet as the whole frame
of the will in this case indicated
no more than a mere discretionary
power to sell any part of the real
estate, no conversion, was worked.
These words, "Lastly, it is my
will, that, after the death of my
beloved wife, all my estate be appraised and sold as soon as it can
be done with advantage; and if
any of my sons think proper to
take the farm on which I now live,
at the appraisement, he shall have
the privilege of doing so on paying
the other heirs their respective
shares; and it is my will that. all
the money arising from the sale of
my real estate be equally divided
among all my children share and
share alike," were held an express
direction to sell, and the fact that
the will further permitted one of
the sons at his option to take the
farm at the valuation to be made,
did .not change the effect of the
direction to sell. Whether or not
a son acquired the farm, it was
nevertheless a sale, and the one
taking it became a purchaser:
Laird's App., 85 Pa., 339,
The probable Pennsylvania rule
on this doctrine is found in Jones
v. Caldwell, 97 Pa., 42, where Mr.
Justice PAxsox delivering the opinion of the court, says: "An absolute direction to sell lands after the
death of the testator's widow, and
to divide the proceeds among his
children, effects an equitable conversion thereof into personalty."
The testator in this case left the
income of his real estate to his wife,
so long as she remained his widow,
and after her death he directed his
executors to dispose of all his property real, personal and mixed, and
he goes on to say that if his heirs

agree to a division of the estate
amongst themselves, the executors
are not to be bound to make the
sale. This subsequent provision
does not prevent a conversion, because it is surplusage and may be
stricken from the will without altering its legal effect. The law gives
the heirs the right to elect to take
the property as real estate. The
testator must have intended a conversion even in the event of a division of the estate among the heiis
by agreement. There were eight
heirs, and but five separate properties of unequal values. Be that
as it may, to have divided them
would have required either a sale
between themselves or partition
according to law. The latter wofild
have necessarily involved an appraisement .and sale, and hence a
conversion.
The fact that one of several bene-

ficiaries may be given an option to
take the property -in its unconverted state does not prevent a conversion from taking place: Laird's
App., 85 Pa., 339; Pyle's App.,
102 Pa., 317 ; Miller v. Commonwealth, iii Pa., 321.
In number one hundred of the
Pennsylvania State Reports are
found two cases which treat the
subject of conversion rather fully.
The irst is Roland v. Miller, at
page 47, in which a, testatrix directed that all her personal estate
should be equally divided among
her children and heirs at law.
Further on in the will she made
the same disposition of the proceeds from any sale of her real
estate. The executors were not to
be compelled by her heirs to sell
any real estate until the expiration
of the term for which such real
estate might be leased. She prohibited the sale of any real estate
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for ten years after her decease, unless her executors should deem it
advantageous or advisable to sell
the whole or any part, in which
case they were authorized and empowered to do so within the term
of ten years. TRUNxuY, J., says:
"It never is presumed that a testator intended to die intestate as to
any part of his estate if a contrary
intent can be fairly deduced from
the language of his will. The natural and reasonable intendment of
this will is, that the realty shall be
sold and the proceeds divided
among the legatees. Within a
limited time the executors have
unlimited discretionary power to
sell, after that time they are bound
to-sell. A provision that the executors shall not be compelled to sell,
by the heirs, until the expiration
of a stipulated term, implies that
then they may be compelled. The
power vested in the executors, discretionary for a certain time, thereafter is unconditional, notdependent on discretion or contingency,
nor upon the consent or agreement
of any person, and if they neglect
or refuse to exercise it, they may
be compelled to perform their duty
by legal process at the instance of
any legatee."
The other case in this same volume of reports is Bright's App.,
ioo Pa., 602. Here the testator
directed all his real estate to be
sold for the payment of debts and
legacies; some of it he directed
should be sold immediately. So
much of it as was not necessary for
the payment of debts he directed
should not be sold till the first day

of April, I866. Mr. Justice PAXSON says : " That the real estate
was converted by the will is too
plain for argument. Here was an
express direction to sell, and divide

the proceeds among nieces and
nephews. It depended upon no
contingencies except time, than
which there is nothing more certain."
Where land is devised to executors with a direction to sell, the
legal title thereto vests in them,
but by some decisive act on .he
part of the heirs or beneficiaries it
is possible for them to divest the
legal title, and take the land in
lieu of money: Anderson v. Anderson, 133 Pa., 408.

A will containing this clause,
"I give to my executors power to
sell and dispose of the whole or'
any portion of my real estate or
personal property, if they find it
necessary to do so in order to make
a fair and equitable division of n4y
estate," was held not to work an
equitable conversion: Sheridan u.
Sheridan, 136 Pa., 14.
Mr. Justice Wnrf, mJs in the
above case said: "The will gives a
power of sale, but leaves the question whether it shall be exercised'
or not to the discretion of the executors. The reason why a power
of sale works a constructive conversion is only that it makes an
actual conversion certain, which is
not the case where discretion to
use the power or not is left to the
executors. The estate is treated at
once as havingthe qualities it mustnecessarily have where the power
is exercised."
A testator bequeathed all his
estate to his wife, for her use, as
long as she remained his widow.
If she desired the land to be sold,
the executor was to sell it, the proceeds to be invested for her use for
life, or as long as she remained his
widow. Held not to work a conversion, as the direction was not
positive and explicit, and the will
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did not decisively fix upon the
land the quality of money: Machemer's F state, 140 Pa., 544.
In Hunter v. Anderson, 152 Pa.,
386, an agreement that a trustee
shall sell certain land and distribute the proceeds was considered
as having worked a conversion, and
the purchaser from the trustee took
the land free from liens against the
cestuis gue trust and unaffected by
the dower of their wives.
The case of Pahnestock v. Fahnestock, 152 Pa., 56, is a good
illustration of an equitable conversion effected, not by an express
direction to sell, but by a power of
sale given to executors, and the
impossibility of otherwise carrying
out the clearly expressed intention
of the testator in his will. Mr.
Justice McCuLLom said : "It is not
contended that the words, 'I hereby empower and authorize my executors to sell all my real and personal property, at private or public
sale, and make and execute deeds
in fee simple for my real estate,'
standing alone, operate as a conversion, but it was thought by the
learned judge below, and it is insisted upon by the appellees here,
that these words taken in connection with the other provisions of
the will, exhibit a clear intention
and purpose on the part of the testator that his real and personal
property shall be converted into
money for investment, and the collecion and disbursement of interest or income in accordance with
his directions therein, and further,
that it is not possible to execute
the will according to its terms
without such a conversion of his
real estate.
A mere naked power to sell real
estate does not operate as a conversion of it into personalty, but
such p-,wer coupled with a di-

rection or command to sell will
have that effect. If a testator
authorizes his executors to sell his
real estate, and to execute and deliver to the purchasers deeds in fee
simple of the same, as in this case,
and it is clear from the face of his
will. that it was his intention the
power so conferred by him should
be exercised, it will be construed
as a direction to sell, and will operate as an equitable conversion.
If in addition to the clear intention of the testator, it plainly appears that effect cannot be given to
material provisions of the will
without the exercise of the power,
the conclusion is irresistible that
a conversion is as effectually accomplished by the will, and the
duties of the executor under it are
the same, as if it contained a positive direction to sell.
There can be no final settlement of the estate, in accordance,
with the will, until the power
conferred upon the executor for
the sale of the real and personal
property is exercised, therefore,
conversion in fact must take place,
and in point of equity the estate
is considered as converted from
the time of the death of the tes-

tator.
In the Supreme Court of the
United States Craig v. Leslie is the
leading case, decided in 1818 and
reported in 3 Wheaton, 564. The
direction in the will was as follows :
" I give my real and personal estate to five executors, upon special
trust, that my executors will sell
both my personal and real estate.
I give and bequeath to my brother
all the proceeds of my estate, both
real and personal, which I have
herein directed to be sold, to be remitted unto him." The brother of
the testator was an alien, and as
such could not take land. The in-
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tention of the testator was clearly
to convert his real estate into personalty, in order that the brother
might take the bequest of the proceeds, and this intention was carried out.
WASHINGTON, J., delivering the
opinion of the court, after reviewing the English authorities, says:
" Were this a new question it
would seem extremely difficult to
raise a doubt respecting it The
common sense of mankind would
determine that a devise of money,
the proceeds of'lands directed to
be sold, is a devise of money, notwithstanding it is to arise out of
land; and that a devise of land,
which a testator directs by his will
to be purchased, will pass an inter-'
est in the land itself, without regard to the character of the fund
out of which the purchase is to be
made.
"The settled doctrine of the
courts of equity corresponds with
this obvious construction of wills,
as well as of other instruments,
whereby land is directed to be
turned into money, or money into
land, for the benefit of those for
,whose use the conversion is intended to'be made."
In Peter v. Beverly, io Peters,
532, .the testator directed certain
land to be sold for the payment of
debts, and did not say who was to
sell. It was held, that the necessary implication was that the executors were to carry out the direction. Craig v. Leslie (suPra) is
quoted, and the doctrine therein
stated adopted.
Taylor v. Benham, 5 How., 233,
was a case in which the following
clause was construed to have
worked a conversion: "I do hereby order, will and direct, that, on
the first day of January next, after

my decease, or as near that day a.
can conveniently be, the whole of
the property that I may die seized
or possessed of, or may be in anywise belonging to me, be sold."
WOODBERRY, J., says: "Courts

in

carrying out the wishes of testators,
the pole star in wills, are much inclined, especially in equity, to
vest all the powers or interest in
executors which are necessary to
effectuate those wishes, if the
language can fairly admit it. They
are inclined, also, when considering it a trust, or a power coupled
with an interest, to have its duration and quantity commensurate
with the object tobe accomplished:
Bradstreet v. Clarke, 12 Wend.,
663; Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend.,
299. The whole of this doctrine
proceeds upon a principle which is
incontrovertible, that where the
testator merely directs the real
estate to be converted for the purposes of the will, so much of his
estate, or the money arising from
it, as it not effectually disposed of
by the will (whether it arises from
some omission or defect in the
will itself, or from any subsequent
accident which may prevent the
devise from taking effect) results
to the heir-at-law: Burr v. Sire, i
Wharton, 252.
See Cropley v.
Cooper, 19 Wall., i67.
.
In New York the doctrine of
equitable conversion has been
adopted in toto, and the rules for
determining whether or not conversion in a specified case is to be
considered as having taken place
are much the same as those applicable in the same case in an English court.
The intention of the testator, if
sufficiently clearly expressed, governs in this matter; when once
that intention is determined, as
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well as in all other questions concerning the construiction and interpretation of wills. There must
be either an express, imperative
direction to the executor or trustee
to sell, or a power of sale given, in
connection with a limitation applicable to the property only in a
changed form from that in which
it is at the time of the testator's
death, or by a blending by the
testator of his real and personal
estate, making it distributable as
personalty.
In the case of, In the Matter of
Gansert, 136 N. Y., ro6, there was
a direction to executors to pay
debts of decedent and certain
legacies. This was followed by a
clause in the following words:
"Giving and granting unto my
said executors and trustees full
power and authority to sell and
convey any and all my real estate,
either at private sale or public auction, and to make, execute and deliver good and sufficient conveyances therefore."
MA NARD, J., says: "The testator well knew that his debts
could not be paid, as directed,
without sale of real estate, and he
intended to clothe his executors
with a power commensurate with
the duties and obligations laid
upon them.
Whenever a power or authority
to sell is given without limitation,
and is not in terms made discretionary, and its exercise is rendered necessary by the scope o
the will and its declared purposes,
the authority is to be deemed imperative, and a direction to sell
will be implied, provided the design and purpose of the testator is
unequivocal, and the implication
so strong as to leave no substantial
doubt, and his intention cannot

otherwise be carried out: Scholle
v. Scholle, 113 N. Y., 261; Chamberlain v. Taylor, io5 N. Y., 194;
Hobson v. Hale, 95 N. Y., 593.
The real and personal estate if
blended in one gift to the executors
for a common trust, in which all
the beneficiaries share equally. In
such -cases the exercise of a general and unlimited power of sale is
imperative, and riay be compelled
in favor of any party who is lawfully entitled under the provisions
of the will to the real property,
when sold.
In the case of Clift v. Moses ii6
N. Y., 144, the following power
given to an executor was held not
to work a conversion as a sale was
not absolutely necessary for the
purposes of the will: "I give and
devise to my executor and executrix all my real and property of
every kind in trust for the purpose
of paying my debts and legacies
named in this, my last will, giving
them power to sell, mortgage and
convey any and all real estate for
the purposes above named."
HAIGHT, J., ilelivering the opinion of the court, said: "Conversion
arises only from an express, clear,
and imperative direction, or from
a necessary implication of such: 6
Am. and Bng. Encyclopedia of
Law, 665. The question of conversion is one of intention, and the
question is did the testator intend
to have his real estate converted
into personalty immediately upon
his death? The whole will, and
the circumstances of each case
must be considered in deciding this
question. If he did so intend, the
court must give this intention effect, and treat the realty as personalty from the time of his death.
If, however, he intended to give the
executor, or trustee under his will,
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a power to convert, leaving it discretionary with them to convert or
not, the conversion will depend
upon the will or discretion of the
executor or trustee, and will not
be regarded as consummated in
law, until it id consummated in
fact. In the will under consideration a power to sell, mortgage or
convey any or all of the real estate
is given. It is left entirely discretionary with the executor ortrustee
whether the sale shall be made or
not; and as to whether the whole,
or a portion only, shall be sold. It
follows that there was no conversion until the executor exercised
the power and consummated the
sale:" Henderson v. Henderson,21
N. Y., 8oo; Parker v. Liiden, 22
N.Y., 614.
]vidently the distinction between Clift v. Moses, and In re
Gansert, is to be found in the circumstances of each estate-in Clift
v. Moses there was sufficient personal estate to pay all debts and
legacies-without a sale and, therefore, the intention to convert could
not be imputed to the testator,
while in In re Gansert there was
not sufficient personal estate for
the purposes of the will, and the
testator, with knowledge of such
fact, having directed the accomplishment of those purposes, must
be considered as having at the same
time directed a sale of his real estate to make up the deficiency, and
thereby worked a conversion out
and out.
A mere power of sale in the executor does not work a constructive
change of the property. The duty
to sell must be imperative: In the
Matter of the Will of Fox, 52 N.Y.,
530-

But where a power of sale is

given, and it is apparent from the
general provisions of the will that
the testator intended his real estate

to be sold, the doctrine of equitable
conversion applies: Phelps v. Bond,
23

N. Y., 69.

In the case of Fisher v. Banta, 66
N. Y., 438, the will directed the
executors to divide the real estate
equally between the testator's two
sons, and a codicil directed his executors to sell his real estate. It
was held that the direction to 'sell
was indicative of an intention on
the part of the testator that his
land should be divided between his
two sons as personalty. By this
construction both clauses of the
will were effectively carried out.
Had the first direction been obeyed;
and theland distributed,.the second
direction could not have been of
any effect, for there would have
been no land left to sell, and the
direction would have been nugatory.
If the direction to sell is imperative, requiring a sale at all events,
and leaving it discretionary with
the executors only as to the time
and manner of selling, the conversion will be considered as taking
place at the death of the testator,
and the. sale when made has the
same effect, in respect to the rights
of the parties in interest, as thougli
made immediately: Arnold v. Gilbert, 5 Barb., S. Ct., 192.
"Upon the principles of equitable conversion," said the chancellor, in Lorillard v. Coster, 5 Paige,
173, "money directed by the testator to be employed in the purchase
of land, or land directed to be sold
and turned into money is, in this
court, for all the purposes of the
will, considered as that species of
property into which it is directed to
be converted; so far as the purposes
for which such conversion is
directed to be made are legal, and
can be carried into effecL"
The same principle is also appli-
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cable to the case of a direction in
awill to sell one piece of land, and
to convert it into another for the
purposes of the will, by investing
the proceeds of the sale in the purchase of such other lands, under a
valid power of trust, to make such
sale and reinvestment.
The general doctrine as adopted
in New York is vindicated at some
length in Kane v. Gott, 24 Wend.,
641, in which a trust in the executors was created, with imperative
directions to sell, as soon as may
be, the testator's whole real estate,
and appropriate the avails to the
purposes of the will, in conhection
with his other personal property.
By his own act the testator had the
power to throw the land into this
shape, either by sale before his
death or by his will: Gott v. Cook,
7 Paige Ch., 521; Van Vetchen v.
Van Vetchen, 8 Paige, io6; Stagg
v. Jackson, x Comstock, 2o6.
In Vhite and Tudor's Leading
Cases in Equity, Vol. i, Part ii,
page II59, it is said, "The courts
of Kentucky, though they do not
reject the principle, obviously regard it-with disfavor," and in support of this the following cases are
cited: Clay v. Hart, 7 Dana, i; and
-Samuel v. Samuel's Administrators, etc., 4 B. Mon., 245.
Clay v. Hart does not support
this statement, as the only point
decided in that case, touching in
any manner upon equitable coffversion, was that where a mere direction was given to executors to exercise discretion whether to sell or
not, the power could not be exercised by the survivor of the executors. As there was no devise to
them of the legal title, nor of any
personal interest, nor any direction
to sell, no equitable conversion was
considered to have been worked.

Indeed the same rule is applied
in Kentucky as in England and
Pennsylvania. The question is,
does the testator direct a sale, and
show an intention that the beneficiaries shall take as legatees and
not as devisee, if so the land is converted as of the death of the testator. The Court says in this case:
"Had the testator, peremptorily
directed the sale of the land (and
not for a special purpose, that
might fail, or not require the sale
of the whole of it) so that none of
it could in any event go to the
heirs, or devisees, it would have
been treated, in equity, at the instant of his death, as a portion of
his personal estate, and a direct
and unconditional gift. A -testamentary gift to his wife and children of the produce of the sale,
might have been considered as a
legacy for the payment of which
the executor was bound by law.
The words of the will in this case
formed no direction of sale, the
title to the land passed, by the will,
to the beneficiaries, with a discretionary power 'in the executor to
sell the land.
Samuel v. Samuel's Administrators, etc., 4 B. Mon., 245, is the
other case cited to show disapproval
of the doctrine of equitable conversion, by the courts of Kentucky.
True it is here said to be extremely
artificial, and that it will not be
applied, by the Chancellor, to
change the quality of property, as
the testator has left it, without a
clear indication manifested to give
it character as money or land.
But this is no more than is said
in many other States; indeed,
everywhere the direction must be
imperativ6 to sell, at all events,
thereby imposing a duty on the
trustee or executor in order to effect

EQUITABLE CONVERSION.
an equitable conversion. For it is
the duty to convert, and the certainty that the actual conversion
will take place sooner or later,
which a court of equity construes,
as a conversion from the death of
the testator. Here the testator devised all his estate, real, personal
and mixed to three trustees, with
full power and authority, in their
discretion, to sell and convey any
of his estate, and he directs the

trustees, in finally settling up and
adjusting and paying over the
amount of the proceeds of his
estate, to distribute among three
children all such sums of money as
shall belong to said estate. The
direction is made discretionary in
terms. Though the last clause
might be construed as expressing
an expectation on the part of the
testator that his estate would be all
converted, yet it was not sufficiently
clear to infer from it a direction to
the trustees to sell at all events, and
thereby to work a constructive conversion.
In the opinion it is said: "It
may have been described as money,
in the residuary clause, not for the
purpose of controlling the discretion of the trustees', nor of indicating an intention that the legatees
should have nothing but money,
but only because the testator may
have expected, that under the discretionary power of the trustees,
the estate would be converted into
money. The Court goes on to say:
"And will such an implied expectation, when there is no command
and the distribution of the estate
in kind, to those to whom it is
given would not violate any express
provision of the will, furnish such
evidence of an intention to convert
the whole estate into money, as to
authorize a courtof equity to regard

it as money, before it is actually
converted? The doctrineof equitable conversion is at best extremely
artificial. Its basis is that things
agreed to be done are treated,. in
equity, as if actually done, but as
the principle is stated in Story's
Equity, Vol. II, 212 and 214, they
are so treated for "many purposes,"
and, therefore, impliedly, not for
all purposes; and the court does
not interfere to change the quality
of the property as the testator has
left it, unless there be some clear
act or intention by which he has
fixed upon it throughout a definite
character, as money or as land.
Nor will equity consider things as
done in this light in favor of every-

body, but only of those who have a
right to pray that it might be done."
It is said in Powell on "Devises," at page 63: "The new character must be decisively and absolutely fixed upon the property."
If trustees may convert it or not as
they see fit, there is no constructive
conversion.
I do not see that such statements
show any obvious disfavor to the
doctrine itself, nor can I find any
expressions in Hite v. Hite, the
case taken for annotation, which is
a decision of a Kentucky court,
showing that equitable conversion
is any more unfavorably received
in Kentucky than in the other
States. Judge HoLT says, in Hite
v. Hite: "The intention of the
testator must govern."
He undoubtedlyintended that the trustees
should so change and invest the
estate to make all of it productive
of income. This is evident from
the eighth clause of the will which
directs them to invest and dispose
of it, "so as to be safe and produce
income." He must have known
that this could not be done at once,

EQUITABLE CONVERSION.
without sacrifice. This doubtless ik clearly the rule in Kentucky that,
led to his giving them a broad dis- though the time of sale is left to
the discretion of the trustees, yet if
,retion in the matter. The estate
the duty to sell sometime is placed
was large, much of it, at his death,
upon them constructive conversion
uas already productive, and it cannot well be supposed that he ex- will take place.
In Green v. Johnson, 4 Bush.,
pected a part of the principal would
be given to the life tenants to com- 164, decided in 1868, the Court
pensate for a delay which he knew construed the words "authorize
and request" as working a convermust occur before the remainder
could be made so. Then. follows sion. Judge RoBERTSON says: "If,
instead of devising the title to his
the only clause in the opinion that
could possibly be considered as three daughters, and merely rethrowing disfavor upon the doc- questing a sale of the land, the
testator had devised it to the extrine of equitable conversion, which
ecutors, and peremptorily ordered
he had already adopted. The docthem to sell; it is admitted that, as
trine of equitable conversion is at
to that interest, it was money bebest, an artificial, arbitrary one.
queathed, and not land devised.
It will not be applied unless it be
Nevertheless, if thewill con Fernmade the duty of the trustees to
ing the sale must be construed as
sell. The Chief Justice concedes
mandatory, the testator must be
that the duty to sell is imposed
upon the trustees in this case and presumed to have intended a conholds that the discretion given, re- version of the land into money, as
best for the testamentary benefilates only to the time when it shall
ciaries; and his intention if clearly
be done.
manifest for such conversion, made
In Christler v. Medis, 6 B. Mon.,
the land money to the legatees. A
37, and in Hocker v. Gentry, 3
mere authority to sell could not
Meb. (Ky.), 473, the doctrine is
stated, that if the direction to sell have been a cohstructive conversion; but the super-added "reis imperative, the right of the
quest to sell was constructively
legatee will, in equity, be regarded
mandatory, because the unqualified
as a right to money, from the time
of the testator's death, though the request" was the testator's will,
period of sale is remote, and con- and left no discretion not to sell.
version cannot be made until the Authority, analogy and reason
allow no escape from this conclutime arives.
The Court, in the first of the sion. Whatever atestator expresses
above cases, said: "Real estate is as his will is mandatory; and if the
converted into personalty, imme- will is unqualified the executors
diately upon the death of the tes- have no right to refuse its fulfillment. Such "request" is synonytator, only where the direction to
sell is positive, without limitation mouswith "require," or "direct,"
The testator seemed
or "order."
and without discretion as to time,
to think that his provident end, of
on the part of those to whom the
the best interest and security of his
power is delegated."
The statement that the direction
daughters, would be most advantageously attained by converting
of sale must be without limitation
certain lands into money, and for
as to time cannot stand, because it
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that purpose he requested his executors to make the conversion.
This, in equity, was conversion
itself, and, therefore, the daughters
took money instead of land.
A court that will construe "request" as synonymous with "direct,"in order to hold that an equitable conversion has been effected,
can hardly be said to look upon the
doctrine with disfavor. See also
Collins v. Champ's Heirs, 15 B.
Mon., I8.
When land directed to be sold is
devised to certain persons, they
take a gift of 'money; but if they
elect to take the land as land, the
sale need not actually take place,
though the beneficiaries are regarded as purchasers. So, if the
testator inserts in his will a clause
giving a legatee the right to elect
to take the land instead of money,
yet as this is giving him no greater
right than the law had. already
given him, such a will is considered
as working a conversion of the land:
Rawlings v. Landis, 2 Bush., i58 ;
Perkins v. Coghlan, z48 Mass., 30;
McFadden v. Hefley, 28 S. C., 317.
King v. King, 13 Rhode Island,
5oi (1882), shows that the courts of
Rhode Island hi.ve adopted the
doctrine in its entirety. The clause
of the will construed in this case
was one by which the testator gave
his executors a general authority
and power of sale of his real estate.
He says: "They may from time to
time, and as often as they deem to
be for the interest of said trust, sell
and convey any of my real estate,
and invest the proceeds. DuRFXB, C. J., asks: "What was the
the testator's intention ? The rule
being that, in equity, the property
will be treated as being already
what it was intended that it should
become. Did the testator intend

simply to give the executor or trustee under his will a power to convert, leaving it discretionary with
them to convert or not? If so, the
conversion will depend upon the
will or discretion of the executors
or trustees, and will not be considered as consummated in law until
it is consummated in fact." In
support of this ,tatement, the'Chief
Justice cites several English cases
and Cook v. Cook, 20 N. J. Eq.,
375; Anewalt's App., 42 Pa., 414;
Chew v. Nicklin, 45 Pa., 84. The
question of the testator's intention
is decided by the rule given, in
Story's Equity, Vol. ii,
214, already quoted, or as the rule is elsewhere laid down: "For the will to
operate as a conversion, it must

show in terms, or by necessary implication, that the testator intended
the property to be converted absolutely, and at all events." The
reason for this rigor of construc
tion is, that there is not a spark of
equity between the next of kin and
the heir, and that therefore neither
ought to lose the right which the
existing character of the property
gives him until it is clearly demonstrated that the testator intended
to have it changed.
In New Jersey, the case of Cook
v. Cook, 2o N.J.Eq., 375, contains
the rule applicable there. Chancellor ABRAHrAM ;ZABRISKIM, in

construing the following words in
a will: "I do authorize and empower my executors to sell and dis-

pose of all my real estate," says:
"When land is directed to be sold,

absolutely and positively, without
any time fixed for sale, it is considered as converted into money,
from the death of the testator; but
for this, the direction must b 9 imperative. If it is optional with the
executor whether to sell or not to

